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Abstract 
Less than desirable indigenous birth rates in Western Europe have generated 
interest toward examining the question of natalism — an organised state initiative 
to manage and promote reproduction, child rearing, health, as well as related neo-
traditional cultural values — from a comparative perspective. This paper reviews 
the history of natalism in the USSR and contemporary Russia within the greater 
framework of modernity, by focusing on sweeping questions of ideology and 
geopolitics as well as current historic models. Economic stability is not an 
unimportant factor, yet it is authentic traditional culture that is of equal, if not 
greater, importance, even if expressed through state policies. 
JEL classification 
Z; J13; J11 
Keywords 
USSR; Russia; natalism; Modernity; demographics; neo-traditionalism 
Kouprianova ● Modernity and natalism in Russia 
 
149
Introduction 
“I can’t believe I wanted an abortion,” states a rather blunt Soviet poster from 1961, 
depicting a woman looking fondly upon her newborn.1 Those with a popular 
knowledge of Russian history associate the natalist drive in the USSR with the 
iconic heroic-mother imagery in the era of Joseph Stalin. Yet natalism first 
appeared in 1920s Soviet Union and has not left since (perhaps, with certain 
exceptions in the 1990s-early 2000s). This was — and remains — an organised 
state initiative to manage and promote reproduction, child rearing, health, 
education, and socio-cultural mores, as they pertain to family relations at large, not 
just the fertility drive in the strict demographic sense of the word. The government’s 
attempts to boost the population size in the USSR and the Russian Federation, 
respectively, appeared to coincide with modest to positive results, whether the 
Stalinist programme of overt propaganda and awards that were paralleled by a 
natural population increase after the Second World War or the contemporary 
Vladimir Putin era campaign that combines financial reward and cultural projects.   
Historically, natalism is a product of modernity. Pre-modern governments in the 
West and Russia certainly maintained an interest in the people they governed in 
terms of taxation, military service, and territorial control, among others. But it was 
not until the post-Enlightenment period that the state sought to make its respective 
populations “legible” as scholar James Scott put it. It accomplished the latter by 
dividing its subjects into manageable segments, thereby monopolizing its ability to 
intervene, and demonstrating a progressively greater investment in its subjects’ 
health, reproduction, education as the marriage between technical capabilities and 
social capital, and other formerly privately held categories within a particular 
ideological framework (in the 20th century, these were liberalism, communism, and 
fascism) (Scott 1998: 78). Today, many scholars do not question state involvement 
in these matters, per se, only their extent. By and large, criticism of the attempts to 
boost fertility comes from ecologists and those concerned with global population 
growth in relation to the planet’s limited resources. 
In terms of birth rates, specifically, modern states’ most basic motivation thereof 
stemmed from the need to replenish those lost in war. There were also vital 
geopolitical concerns, i.e., maintaining a population large enough to defend a 
country’s borders, especially applicable in the case of resource-rich USSR and its 
heir. Another relevant factor was the relationship between workforce size, social 
services, and taxation levels (hidden or otherwise) both in historically industrial 
socialist countries and in contemporary service- and consumption-oriented liberal 
democracies of the West.2  
In this context, European welfare states may seem benign by comparison to their 
authoritarian counterparts, but their keen interest in the subject of birth rates, 
education, and other related matters in Europe-proper is guided by the same 
overarching principle of population “legibility.” In the decades since the 1970s, the 
reasons for mass immigration into Europe have been economic, demographic, and 
postcolonial.3 That is to say, its immediate purpose has been to ensure that an 
adequate number of taxpayers is available in order to maintain all the social 
programs along with other tax-funded projects, not to mention guaranteeing 
sufficient support for a Western European liberal democracy in its variants. 
                                                                                                         
1 See poster selection “Materinstvo v illiustratsiiakh,” Materinstvo.ru (consulted 10 March 2013): 
materinstvo.ru/art/6214/. 
2 In terms of ideology, it would be more accurate to use the term “post-liberal” after 1991, as I explain 
below. However, I cover large periods of time in this paper, hence the usage of “liberalism” to avoid 
confusion. 
3 Some argue that migration is primarily economically driven, but one cannot divorce the importance 
thereof from the Western European liberal democratic ideology per se. 
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Supranational bureaucratic bodies like the United Nations regularly issue reports 
with thinly veiled threats about raising the retirement age to 75, for instance, if 
certain migration levels are not maintained in order to support the current system.4 
First, it is questionable as to whether the migrants can theoretically support the low 
indigenous birthrates, ultimately leading to systemic failure. Second, the new 
Europeans’ relocation comes at a price for both the migrants and the hosts. Of 
course, the implicit (or, at times, explicit) population management technique here 
comprises a strong socio-cultural component, ensuring that the said newcomers 
adhere to the dominant secular liberal ideology — which, at times, is quite foreign 
to their own background — under the faulty assumption that cultures are 
interchangeable. On the other hand, they undermine the ethno-cultural cohesion of 
the dominant indigenous peoples. Considering the attention paid to the failures of 
this brand of multiculturalism in the European and American media in the recent 
years, it is unsurprising that there is an interest in somewhat alternative models like 
the Russian natalist variant.5 
When it comes to natalism in the USSR, specifically, Western liberal historians 
generally place it in the context of “neo-traditionalism.” They describe it as a 
phenomenon, in which modern secular states take over the role of authentic, 
spontaneously occurring tradition in pre-modern societies, realizing the sheer 
power of the latter as a mobilisation tactic. In this view, “neo-traditionalism” in the 
USSR ranged from the limited reintroduction of patriarchal gender roles to the 
usage of historic and folk heroes for agitational purposes (Martin 2000: 348-367). 
This framework is not inaccurate, and is quite practical. However, it emphasises 
the powerful state, while somewhat downplaying the vast support thereof among 
the masses. Of course, Western scholars of Russian history have rejected the 
original black and white “totalitarian” model of a near-omnipotent government and a 
submissive, oppressed population, but continue to debate the particular 
relationship between the state and its subjects. 
In order to understand the longevity of natalist initiatives and their apparent 
successes (or lack thereof), we must examine their roots. Let us briefly review the 
facts both in the USSR and contemporary Russia. Each historical period will be 
accompanied by an analysis focused on ideology, as a partial imposition or 
borrowing of a foreign, i.e., Western European value system, as well as geopolitics, 
surpassing ideology. We will then discuss the benefits and drawbacks of current 
historic models and offer an alternative view that incorporates Russian folkic 
undercurrents in the era of modernity and postmodernity. In other words, the 
primary focus here is the history and theory of natalism in the USSR and Russia 
within a socio-cultural framework, not specific fertility behaviour, policies, and other 
heavily statistical information, although some applicable examples will be given.  
History of Natalism in the USSR 
The earliest Soviet posters advocating natalism appeared at the beginning of the 
1920s immediately after the Revolutionary and Civil wars, when the new regime 
consolidated its military and political power just enough to focus on social and 
cultural issues affecting the new political entity. They pointed both to ideological 
concerns — the increased role in child rearing on the part of the state as one of the 
goals to create a new generation of productive Soviet citizens — along with 
practical replenishment of those who died in combat. While this concern found its 
                                                                                                         
4 “New Report on Replacement Migration Issued by UN Population Division” (17 March 2000), United 
Nations Press Release (consulted 7 July 2013): 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000317.dev2234.doc.html. 
5 See, for instance, “Merkel says German multicultural society has failed,” BBC (consulted 8 March 
2013): http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11559451. 
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greatest expression throughout the 20th century, it had even earlier roots within the 
modern Western liberal paradigm which undoubtedly affected pre-revolutionary 
Russia. This was the state’s growing attention to the bodies of its subjects, which at 
the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century pertained to questions of 
cleanliness, hygiene, and public health particularly in the case of the lower classes. 
Arguably, one of the better known initiatives in public memory was that of Jacob 
Riis, whose photographs of New York slums were used to garner interest in social 
reform (Riis 1890). 
In the nineteenth century Russian Empire, the state’s involvement in the matters of 
the body pertained by and large to the question of corporal punishment and military 
service. Otherwise, family matters were generally a private issue as compared to 
modern and contemporary macro- and micro-management; there was no unified 
system of school education, for instance. Large families were desirable for two 
reasons. First, much like elsewhere, having several children ensured that at least 
some of them survived into adulthood at a time when many detrimental health-
related factors, such as epidemics, could strike populations. Second, the Russian 
Empire was generally a religious society, making the patriarchal family structure 
and large family size preferable. For religious adherents, regardless of 
denomination, there was a certain sense of shared responsibility to having children, 
which was not one of the state, but one of faith and cultural traditions.  
In the last hundred years, if any generalisations could be made about the purpose 
of natalist policies in the USSR and Russia from the point of view of the state, then 
it is two-fold. First comes geopolitics in order to maintain a population large enough 
to defend the country’s borders. Second comes social engineering within the 
general context of modernity in order to provide adequate workforce-taxpayer 
numbers among responsible patriotic citizenry.  
When it comes to geopolitics, natalism served as a method for producing an 
adequate number of citizens to defend the territorial integrity of the USSR and the 
vast natural resources within — oil, gas, minerals, etc. In modern-day Russia, this 
issue is even more pressing if one were to consider the rising commodity prices. In 
light of the USSR’s and contemporary Russia’s uneven population distribution with 
high concentration in the European part of the continent, the state engaged in a 
number of development and relocation initiatives in Siberia and the Far East in 
order to reduce vulnerability in those areas (e.g., the creation of entire industrial 
cities in the Ural mountains, such as Magnitogorsk, in the Soviet period and 
economic and infrastructural projects in the contemporary Russian Far East, albeit 
lesser by comparison, like Rosneft’s mining operations in Sakhalin). This frontier 
drive can be traced back to Russia’s earliest expansion eastward and Yermak’s 
conquest of Siberia in the late 1500s, not only as the means to access important 
trade routes, but also to control the newly acquired lands militarily and through the 
presence of a sufficiently sized subject population.  
In the modern period, this vulnerability has manifested on numerous occasions — 
from the British attempts to check Russia during the so-called Great Game in 
Central Asia and the Crimean wars in the late imperial period to the thinly veiled 
attempt to move into resource-rich Siberia and the Far East during the Allied 
“intervention” on the part of Anglo-Americans along with Canada, as well as 
France, China, and Japan in 1918, Nazi Germany’s concept of Lebensraum, 
Americans’ so-called “containment” policy during the Cold War, and the ongoing 
encirclement of Russia in the post-Soviet space, for instance, in Central Asia. 
These seemingly unrelated events can be explained by the general Anglo-
American geopolitical trajectory, surpassing ideology, from such theorists as Alfred 
Mahan at the end of the 19th century to Zbigniew Brzezinski at the end of the 20th. 
Terminological fluctuations notwithstanding, the general thrust of this strategy is the 
control of the Heartland, to use Halford Mackinder’s name for Russian-ruled 
Eurasia, in order to gain access to the majority of the world’s natural resources 
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(Mackinder 1904: 421-437). Thus, having a large and more evenly distributed 
population size can be seen as a matter of national survival for the Russians. 
In terms of ideology, after the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet government 
exhibited considerable interest in natalist thinking, although its specific treatment 
changed. Much like the natalist concerns in the modern states of the West in the 
interwar period, the USSR sought to manage its citizens to an unprecedented 
extent, ranging from setting an adequate level of education, culture, and taste to 
dictating attitudes toward their bodies, including the questions of hygiene and 
reproduction. 
At first, in the 1920s, the Bolsheviks attempted to adhere to classic Marxism. In the 
arena of familial relations, this meant getting rid of patriarchal gender roles, 
legalizing abortion, and making divorce procedures simpler, among others. Certain 
radical figures, such as Aleksandra Kollontai, viewed the family institution and 
traditional Christian morality itself as remnants of the bourgeois past that had to be 
discarded, with the worker-state gaining a prominent role in raising children 
communally. The state did become more involved: the earliest Soviet poster 
advertising targeting social matters depicted orphanages featuring Classical 
architecture, which stated, “Children are the future of Soviet Russia”; others 
promoted the link between the health of the mother and her baby through 
government-issued healthcare (Snopkov et al 2006). 
In the 1930s, however, the egalitarian measures from the previous decade were 
replaced by top-down “neo-traditionalism,” as Western historians refer to it. Here, 
the state acted as the civiliser, including the reintroduction of ethnic heroes and 
classics in the arts and education, in light of the dramatically increased literacy 
level for which it was responsible; it also made vast improvements in the area of 
hygiene, fighting diseases, and infant mortality. For the family, this meant a return 
to somewhat patriarchal family values (but not in terms of pre-revolutionary 
property rights of the patriarchs or stay-at-home bourgeois housewives), sobriety, 
as well as natalist propaganda coupled with a ban on abortion, difficult-to-obtain 
divorces, and mockery of irresponsible husbands.6 This change was especially 
noticeable in visual culture. 1920s-early 1930s imagery depicted women in a rather 
gender-neutral manner. By contrast, by the mid-to-late 1930s, the emphasis on 
femininity re-entered social advertising (Hoffmann 2003). Furthermore, whereas 
this subject is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth pointing out that other 
countries in the Soviet Bloc, such as Romania, exhibited certain comparable 
elements of state-imposed neo-traditionalism, such as restrictive abortions (Soare 
2013: 59-78). 
In part, the state’s initiatives were a practical way to address the drop in fertility, 
creating a population crisis in the 1930s, which greatly concerned Soviet 
demographers. The crisis was caused by a number of factors, including the 1932-
33 famine and the elimination of female unemployment, as a result of 
industrialisation and the collectivisation drive in agriculture. With women entering 
the workforce in such a radical manner in a short time period, the government took 
over the role of child care, starting as early as nursery schools (pre-kindergarten) 
around the tender age of two (Hoffmann 2003). Along with successes in the area of 
health and medicine, specifically infant-mortality reduction, the availability of such 
early childhood education facilities comprised the most significant solutions. 
Whereas we obviously cannot argue for the presence of a direct, causal link 
between this kind of social advertising and fertility, it does reflect traditional cultural 
mores at large.     
                                                                                                         
6 It is important to note that the USSR, like the Russian Empire before it and the Russian Federation 
afterward, was a multiethnic entity. Cultural specifics notwithstanding, non-Slavic regions, such as the 
traditionally Muslim-dominated areas in northern Caucasus or Central Asian republics, could be 
described as exhibiting an even greater degree of societal traditionalism. 
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The next decade saw the establishment of the heroic mother (literally, “mother-
heroine”) medal (1944) for women with 10 or more living children (naturally born or 
adopted), as well as two other lesser medals for similar achievements; the lowest 
award, the medal of motherhood, commemorated those with five or six children. 
This type of recognition symbolised one of the ways in which the Soviet 
government chose to combat the massive loss of life (24-26 million) during the 
course of WWII. After the war, the ratio of men to women was rather skewed, 
which caused additional problems. At this time, the state increased financial help to 
women who were pregnant or raising children, in general. Natalist propaganda 
intensified, creating or, at least, emphasizing the atmosphere of communal support. 
Poster advertising featured images of wholesome, but serious mothers surrounded 
by numerous children of all ages, including teenagers already serving in the Soviet 
armed forces. Others promoted orphan adoptions to mitigate the effects of war.7 
The latter was a unifying experience for USSR’s citizens, which approached the 
need to rebuild on a national basis as a common goal. For instance, at the end of 
the war, approximately 41% of orphaned children was adopted or in foster care.8  
Figure 1. Total fertility rate, 1950-2011 
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Data source: Institute of Demography at the National Research University 'Higher School of Economics', 
demoscope.ru. 
Natalist social advertising continued throughout the majority of the Soviet period. 
Many examples targeted proper child care, in which the government played an 
active role, while the mother was at work, on the way to raising the new generation 
of well-educated, cultured, responsible, and healthy Soviet citizens. Abortion was 
legalised once again after Stalin’s death (1953), as part of the general Khrushchev 
era liberalisation. Somewhat lower birth rates in the 1970s have, in part, been 
explained by the rise in the standard of living and related embourgoisement of the 
Brezhnev period. Soviet authorities provided reasonable time for maternity leave, 
maintaining salary and employment, as well as free post-secondary education.9 
This meant that there was little conflict, at least in theory, between having several 
children and being able to provide for them. 
                                                                                                         
7 See poster selection “Materinstvo v illiustratsiiakh,” Materinstvo.ru (consulted 10 March 2013):  
materinstvo.ru/art/6214/; “Gosudarstvennye nagrady za materinstvo,” RIA Novosti (consulted 10 March 
2013): http://ria.ru/society/20090708/176642182.html. 
8 “Istoriia usynovleniia v Rossii,” Usynovlenie.ru (consulted 7 July 2013): 
http://www.usynovite.ru/experience/history/chapter1/. 
9 112 total calendar days before and after birth, maintaining salary and employment were introduced as 
early as 1917, with the possibility to extend the leave (maintaining employment without maintaining full 
salary) up until the point when the child reaches 1 year. Additional measures were taken for women with 
multiple children (“Otpusk po beremennosti i rodam,” Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia (Moscow: 
Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1969-1978)); see same at 
http://demography.academic.ru/2158/ОТПУСК_ПО_БЕРЕМЕННОСТИ_И_РОДАМ. 
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Natalism and Modernity in Scholarship 
Before moving onto contemporary natalist initiatives in the Russian Federation, it is 
worth having a brief look at Western historiography about the subject of “neo-
traditionalism” in the USSR, some of which was already used above. It is also 
important to consider the limitations of current Western scholarship linked to its 
own assumptions analyzing foreign subjects from a liberal (and now, post-liberal) 
perspective through the prism of the individual and the seemingly ever expanding 
“human rights” at the expense of authentic folkic communities. The earliest texts 
about 1930s USSR provided a rather straightforward ideological critique, arguing 
that the Stalinist regime backtracked on the egalitarian achievements of the 
Bolshevik coup d'état, such as women’s rights. These texts can be traced to Leon 
Trotsky’s Revolution Betrayed (1937), in which the exiled politician used Marxist 
analysis in order to highlight the conservative turn within the Soviet Revolution with 
the rise of Stalin. This strict ideological reading made him describe 1930s “neo-
traditionalist” programme as a general embourgoisement of the Soviet society, 
including patriarchal family structure and the emphasis on having several children 
(Trotsky 1937; Timasheff 1946; Dunham 1976). 
In contrast to this analysis from a strictly Marxist ideological perspective, in the last 
20 years or so, the modernity paradigm has become quite prominent in historical 
circles, bridging the gap between the different ideologies of the 20th century and 
drawing from different scholarly publications, including the work of Michel Foucault 
and James Scott’s idea of modern population management, as mentioned above 
(Foucault 1975; Scott 1998). Born during the Enlightenment era, modernity spread 
throughout Europe, Russia, and beyond taking on culturally specific forms and thus 
resulting in an entire spectrum of “modernities.” Its three main ideologies of the 
20th century, liberalism, communism, and fascism, can also be described as three 
political theories. Each theory had a different historical subject: the individual in 
liberalism, class in communism, and the state or race in fascism, affecting the 
specifics of political expression. These ideologies challenged each other as the 
best representation of modernity, and liberalism ultimately triumphed.10 At the 
same time, they all shared several fundamental similarities, such as secularism, 
rationalism, materialism, economic determinism, and the belief in unidirectional, 
infinite progress as part of its unequivocal trust in science. In fact, the latter notion 
of continuous progress, not cycles of growth and decline, was conceived as the 
main trajectory of social and cultural development and the principal driving force in 
history (Dugin 2009). 
Scholars of Russian history in the West have used the modernity spectrum to 
examine the issue of natalism and beyond, arguing that liberal, communist, and 
fascist states were all concerned with the bodies of their subjects, including, but not 
limited to: birth rates, health and hygiene, education as a form of social 
engineering, population replenishment after war; taxation levels (hidden or 
otherwise) as being linked to workforce size and social services of the Western 
welfare state or industry, agriculture, and the military in the historically socialist 
states; subject treatment on a largely ideological level, such as  promoting or 
discouraging abortion as an issue of women’s civil rights or traditional family 
values, and even aesthetics as they pertained to the question of race in Nazism 
and that of class in communism. This type of reading acknowledges cultural 
variation, but prefers the comparative framework of the generalised modernity 
paradigm.  
Western historians especially gravitated toward what they saw as the most 
“natural” comparison between Nazi Germany and Stalinist USSR as the two most 
                                                                                                         
10 The triumph of liberalism (for the sake of convenience, in 1991 with the Soviet collapse) as the most 
accurate representation of modernity also coincides with the beginning of postmodernity. 
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extreme cases of modern population management (Hoffmann 2003). However, 
other studies demonstrated that this phenomenon was not limited to what these 
historians defined as “authoritarianism” (previously, “totalitarianism”). For instance, 
Mary Louise Roberts examined the natalist drive in France in the wake of the First 
World War and its massive loss of life, including suppressing contraception, linking 
it to Vichy regime era conservative gender relations (Roberts 2003: 91-101). 
Others analysed the authoritarian streak within nominally liberal regimes, as in the 
case of Gordon Chang’s study of the Japanese internment camps in the United 
States during WWII (Chang 2003: 189-204). 
Depicting the natalist drive in the West and Russia as one of the many population 
management techniques used by a powerful and intrusive state is not inaccurate, 
but provides only one piece of the puzzle. It certainly does not fully explain the 
support of the modern state on the part of the masses. For instance, what was the 
relationship between the Soviet government and nearly half a million women — 
i.e., the total number of those awarded the heroic mother medal — who were 
motivated to have more than ten children, each?11 Western historians have 
realised the sheer complexity of this question when they linked it to the subject of 
resistance — that of individuals against the state. One of the difficulties here is 
rooted in divergent views of what comprises resistance, active and passive, and 
how to explain the support of a powerful state outside of various types of coercion 
(Viola 2002).12 A recent study by the Carnegie Endowment Fund concluded that 
contemporary Russians are “confused” because Stalin’s popularity has grown 
among them, which does not fit into this think tank’s liberal world view.13 The latter 
is part of a greater trend, often ignoring cultural diversity and specificity and 
measuring non-Western societies by liberal standards as mentioned above.  There 
has to be something else that could adequately explain the relationship between 
the modern state, the supportive masses (exceptions notwithstanding), and the 
institution of “neo-traditionalism,” which stood in seeming contradiction to the early 
years of the Soviet regime, when it attempted to adhere to Marxist dogma as 
closely as possible. 
Recently, Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin attempted to explain that very 
“something.” Admittedly, he ventured beyond the subject of history and used 
Gilbert Durand’s two-tier method — the sociology of the imaginary, which 
synthesises the work of Carl Jung on the collective unconscious and that of David 
Émile Durkheim on the collective consciousness. This sociological research area 
refers to the sum total of overt cultural features as the logos, whereas mythos 
represents the symbolic and archaic undercurrents pushed into the unconscious in 
the rationalist, secularist, science-focused modern period. Ideally, there should be 
a strong connection between the logos and mythos, and the former should be an 
expression of the latter. The sociology of the imaginary has existed for a number of 
decades, but is a rather new direction for examining one’s own history for Russian 
scholars. Its primary usefulness lies in its ability to supplement the aforementioned 
historic models (Dugin 2010).  
In fact, Dugin asserts that the last several hundred years of Russian history, by and 
large, comprised the imposition or borrowing of a foreign Western European logos 
— and the transition from one such logos to another. The latter can be contrasted 
                                                                                                         
11 Between 1944-1991, according to “Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the first 
decree ‘On awarding the honorary title of ‘Mother Hero’ to mothers of many children’,” President’s 
Library (consulted 10 March 2013): http://www.prlib.ru/en-us/history/Pages/Item.aspx?itemid=296. It 
would be too simplistic to reduce these numbers to the lack of birth control. 
12 The question of resistance in the USSR is beyond the scope of this paper. 
13 De Waal, Thomas et al (2013) “The Stalin Puzzle: Deciphering Post-Soviet Public Opinion,” The 
Carnegie Endowment Fund for International Peace (consulted 1 March 2013): 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2013/03/01/stalin-puzzle-deciphering-post-soviet-public-opinion/. 
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with the fixed unconscious level of Russian culture, including myths, symbols, and 
dreams. Under the influence of the rationalist Enlightenment paradigm, there has 
been a tendency to suppress one’s own myths (whether in the case of crushing the 
folk ways by the Europeanizing policies on the part of Peter the Great or the 
attempts to root out Orthodox Christianity during the early Bolshevik days), pushing 
them into the unconscious tier. This approach unifies and interprets the seemingly 
diverse processes and regime changes in Russian history in this broad time period 
under the umbrella of modernity, during which gradual secularisation occurred 
(Dugin 2010: 73). 
The Russian version of the mystical nocturnal regime, in which the country’s 
collective imagination functions, is associated with dreams of unity, absorption, and 
amalgamation, hence the appeal of the communal aspects of communism to 
Russians as a whole.14 As a result, Dugin asserts that the popular support for 
communism in the USSR was based on the marriage between the rational Marxist 
logos and the irrational Russian mythos, thereby establishing the Soviet system, 
which was oriented toward achieving this mystical unity in the future. In other 
words, many aspects of the Soviet system embodied the realisation of the people’s 
collective unconscious. In fact, despite its rationalist, secularist roots in the 
Enlightenment period, the communist myth itself was a “unique and special 
archetype of the collective unconscious, a dream about an earthly paradise, in 
which the eschatological messianic cult opposed the official Christian religion,” 
writes Dugin (Dugin 2010: 22, 60-65, 77-78). Ultimately, the myth of progress 
within modernity at large — leading toward this kind of a paradise — was, too, akin 
to irrational religious sentiment.  
Let us apply Dugin’s argument about mythic undercurrents under the apparently 
secular and rational communist regime to cover the subject of “neo-traditionalism.” 
We can suggest that the partial return to certain traditional aspects of Russian 
culture, albeit within the framework of a modern state, was not merely a calculated 
population management method. The authorities themselves functioned as carriers 
of the strong folkic undercurrents in Russian culture, and, after the first dozen years 
under the strict Marxist — foreign — logos, the system morphed to include those 
aspects that were more naturally acceptable to the Russian society, such as those 
elements of “neo-traditionalism” described above.15 
Thus, we can summarise the selective turn to traditionalism within the modern 
framework as follows. Revolutionary regimes that came into power through 
violence and instituted a radical social, political, and cultural programme cannot 
continue to function in the same extreme mode for an indefinite time period. 
Eventually (shortly), they arrive at normalisation, which considers the cultural 
particulars of its subject population as a kind of negotiation between them and the 
ruling elite. In the case of twentieth century Russia, an almost 10-year period 
comprising the naked violence of WWI, the Bolshevik Revolution, and the Civil War 
was accompanied (or followed) by a short period of turbulent social and cultural 
changes when the new Soviet state implemented a programme closely reflecting 
the foreign Marxist doctrine. By the mid-1920s, the state began to gradually 
introduce policies, haphazard at first, that were closer linked to the cultures 
comprising the USSR, resulting in “neo-traditionalism” by the mid-1930s. Roughly 
speaking, the case with the late 1980s-1990s was similar in terms of the attempts 
                                                                                                         
14 Dugin’s assertion is based on several culturological factors, such as the predominance of powerful 
female characters in Russian fairy tales. 
15 There is even evidence for Dugin’s assessment about the feminoid nature of Russian culture, with 
links to powerful female folk-tale characters, in 1930s social advertising. Despite the seeming 
reintroduction of patriarchal family life, the latter frequently depicted women as the centre and the glue 
of the family, whereas men were portrayed as irresponsible and prone to mistreating wives and children. 
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to rapidly import another foreign liberal-capitalist system — with every imaginable 
negative consequence — followed by relative normalisation of the Putin era.  
Post-Soviet Russia 
With that in mind, let us have a look at the last 20 or so years of Russia’s 
demographic policies and cultural perspectives, informed by an understanding that 
post-Soviet Russia has partially adopted the liberal-capitalist system. For instance, 
its current Constitution is based on Western European models, and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) puts pressure on the country to tighten its fiscal 
policy and increase the retirement age, as it does in Europe. Whereas liberalism 
takes root at the same Enlightenment source as communism, its focus on the 
individual is even less of a fit for communally oriented Russians. 
Indeed, the tension between Russia’s traditionalist (authentic or state-sponsored) 
perseverance in the face of Western liberal onslaught has even been implicitly 
mentioned in recent demographic studies about the country. Sergei Zakharov 
notes, for instance, that Russian completed-fertility levels of real cohorts differ little 
from Europe, yet Russia exhibits “neo-traditionalism” by displaying an early age for 
marriage and having the first child along with preferences for the woman’s primary 
role as a mother (Zakharov 2008: 250). In addition, a more “clan-like” structure, in 
which grandparents and other relatives take an active role in child rearing — in 
contrast to the Western ideal of a “nuclear” family — is also quite prevalent. 
Ultimately, despite all these reasons, his argument is that Russia is heading the 
way of Europe if trends persist. But to what extent are these conclusions drawn 
from the constraints of their ideological framework?   
After all, for demographers and policy makers, it is customary to discuss the latter 
in the context of familiar keywords, “development” and “progress” (here, explicitly 
comparing Russia to Western Europe). Such discussions are based on two major 
assumptions: that there is a single linear path of “development,” and that this path 
ultimately ends up with Western Europe, perhaps with regional peculiarities that 
are trivial in the grand scheme of things; that progress necessarily has positive 
value, as its connotation itself implies. This assumes that each subsequent 
generation supersedes and improves upon the previous one: in other words, our 
ancestors are necessarily believed to be lesser versions of us because they did not 
reduce their existence to an economic-based, consumerist standard of living. 
Scholarly debate is normally framed in these particular terms without questioning 
the extent to which population management along with “development” in the 
direction of the contemporary West are even necessary; if any, criticism comes 
from ecologists concerned with climate change, population growth, and limited 
resources. Indeed, it is possible to view the Russian case in the opposite way: the 
persistence of “neo-traditionalism” as a way of resisting this kind of “development”; 
resilience in the face of modernity and postmodernity both under Soviet 
communism and partial liberalism. 
In terms of fertility, there was noticeable decline toward the end of the Soviet period 
around the time of perestroika with deaths exceeding births shortly after the 
collapse of the USSR, according to Russia’s statistical agency, Rosstat at gks.ru. 
In that decade, in addition to such detrimental factors as lowered life expectancy, 
abortion and divorce rates had been described as the highest in the world by the 
United Nations’ web resource unstats.un.org. Considering the sheer turmoil of that 
period, ranging from questionable privatisation of public assets during the so-called 
“shock therapy” years to hyperinflation of the currency, causing the destruction of 
lifetime savings, the immediate assumption on the part of the government has been 
that the steady improvement of economic conditions would create an increase in 
birth rates. In 2006, Putin made Russian demographics one of the central issues of 
his presidency during his address to the nation. 
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Since then, the solutions to Russia’s dire population predictions have followed a 
two-tier approach involving straightforward financial rewards along with legal 
components as well as a socio-cultural initiative. The best known example of the 
former is the maternal-capital programme, which became operational in 2007. The 
latter involves various types of subsidies for women with more than one child, 
naturally born or adopted. This government aid package can only be spent on the 
child’s education, pension investment, or the improvement of one’s living 
conditions. Residential real estate in the largest cities in Russia (Moscow, St. 
Petersburg) remains near the top of the most expensive list in the world. This factor 
alone impedes certain urbanites from having more than one or two children. In 
terms of the judicial aspect, the state’s attempts to combat relatively high mortality 
(as compared to Western Europe) among men — both due to disease and 
accidents — have involved increased punishment for reckless or inebriated driving, 
limits to the sale of beverages with high-alcohol content, and others. 
Socio-cultural propaganda ranges from billboard advertising and holidays to 
television shows. There are parliamentary suggestions to reintroduce more modest 
versions of the “motherhood” medals.16 Even Western-modeled popular television 
dating shows such as Let’s Get Married! (Davai Pozhenimsia!) systematically 
portray young female contestants who reaffirm their desire of marriage and children 
as their top priority, with careers being secondary, despite coming from urban 
environments. One particular cultural initiative is the All-Russian Day of Family, 
Love, and Faithfulness celebrated on 8 July. This is a typical example of a 
contemporary “neo-traditionalist” project by the state — established in 2008 — but 
with roots going back to older Russian culture, named after SS. Peter and 
Fevronia, medieval patron saints of marriage and love. And while the holiday was 
instituted by a secular government, its very focus points to another player in this 
matter, the Russian Orthodox Church. A traditional pillar of society, the Orthodox 
Church has experienced a true revival in the last 20 years, and has also been 
active in the demographic initiative from an overarching socio-cultural perspective. 
In addition to conventional measures such as the construction of thousands of new 
places of worship and the creation of Church-based orphanages, the Church has 
also embraced the new media, such as social networking, to spread its message of 
traditionalism. This institution sees the Russian population decline as part of the 
same trend affecting Europe (i.e., other historically Christian nations), naming the 
ideology of materialist, individualist liberalism as the culprit. Furthermore, in the last 
decade, there has been a certain sense of rapprochement between the Orthodox 
Church and other faiths, such as the indigenous Muslim clerics in Russia, who 
advocate similar goals for their respective regions.  
Overall, the last 20 years, since the transition into a post-Soviet environment, 
demonstrate lower natural population gains than those of the Soviet period as a 
whole. Of course, we cannot discount the economic factors in their entirety. In 
general, Russians no longer have the multitude of social guarantees that they 
enjoyed as Soviet citizens. In addition to that, in the challenging decade of the 
1990s, the loss of lifetime savings as a result of hyperinflation in the painful 
transition to a market-based economy made some Russians cautious, particularly 
in urban environments, in fear of being unable to provide for their families. As a 
result, they limit themselves with having one or two children.  
The years of Putin’s leadership, specifically, have coincided with a slight natural 
population increase as compared to the previous decade, although still below 
desirable levels. However, it is difficult to attribute the latter to government policies, 
as a cause and effect, rather than the overall stability of the first decade of the 21st 
century. Yet economic factors are only part of the equation, and it is the socio-
                                                                                                         
16 “Gosduma vernet zvanie ‘Mat’-geroinia’,” Izvestiia (consulted 10 March 2013): 
http://izvestia.ru/news/545459. 
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cultural dynamic that is likely to be of greater importance. Despite its self-
proclaimed universalism, the contemporary individualist liberal-capitalist value 
system is specific to the West, and is even further removed from traditional Russia 
than hybridised Soviet socialism. The real solution to the country’s demographic 
issues lies in the realisation of its authentic culture on political and social levels. To 
paraphrase Dugin, Russia’s politics — social and otherwise — must embody the 
country’s own logos, and the latter must be intimately connected to its mythos.  
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